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Keiretsu centrality, profits and profit stability:
A power dependence perspective
Abstract
Prior studies compare keiretsu member firm and independent firm performance. Here, we use
historical and power dependence perspectives to theorize that the Japanese keiretsu system
primarily benefits the most central firms. We test this by examining the performance of two
types of keiretsu firms (central firms and other member firms) within two types of keiretsu
(horizontal and vertical). We hypothesize and find that: (1) central vertical keiretsu firms are
more profitable than central horizontal keiretsu firms; (2) central horizontal keiretsu firms have
greater profit stability than central vertical keiretsu firms; (3) central vertical keiretsu firms are
more profitable than noncentral vertical keiretsu firms; and (4) central horizontal keiretsu
firms have greater profit stability than noncentral horizontal keiretsu firms. Implications for
managers and future research directions are discussed.
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Keiretsu centrality, profits and profit stability:
A power dependence perspective

1. Introduction
Do some firms in a Japanese keiretsu systemically benefit more than others? The
Japanese keiretsu system has attracted strategy (Geringer et al., 2000), management (Bernotas,
2005; McGuire and Dow, 2002), finance (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) and sociology
scholarship (Lincoln et al., 1996), typically emphasizing the unique benefits keiretsu affiliation
offers member firms rather than possible differential performance among different types of
member firms. Prior studies note that keiretsu affiliated firms typically have greater profit
stability than nonkeiretsu firms (Lincoln et al., 1996; McGuire and Dow, 2003) but fail to
compare performance among different types of keiretsu member firms.
Kim et al. (2004) were the first to use power dependence theory to predict performance
differences between central and noncentral members. They compared horizontal keiretsu
member performance to nonkeiretsu firms. They found systematic differences in sales growth
between central and noncentral members under conditions of product and international
diversification and also found support for profitability differences for central and noncentral
firms under conditions of international diversification but not under conditions of product
diversification. Findings with respect to product diversification and profitability indicated that
both central and noncentral firms outperformed nonkeiretsu firms.
Due to their methodology, Kim et al. (2004) was unable to identify performance
differences between central and noncentral firms, particularly when both performed similarly
relative to nonkeiretsu firms leaving open the question of relative performance differences.
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Such differences may be important because variables like profit stability have theoretical
importance and served as the dependent variable of interest in prior studies (Lawrence and
Saxonhouse, 1991; Lincoln et al., 1996; McGuire and Dow, 2003).
Here we expand upon the initial work of Kim et al. (2004) in three ways. First, Kim et
al. (2004) only examined horizontal keiretsu. In contrast we examine both horizontal and
vertical keiretsu. Second, we use differing historical experiences to explain why horizontal
keiretsu central firms emphasize profit stability while vertical keiretsu central firms emphasize
profitability. This undergirds the theoretical bases for hypotheses one and two. Third, Kim et al.
(2004) compared central and noncentral firms’ performance to that of independent firms, an
indirect method of examining the relative performance of keiretsu member type. In contrast we
directly compare central and noncentral firm performance differences for both types of
keiretsu. Using power dependency theory, we hypothesize performance differences between
central and noncentral firms regarding profit stability for horizontal keiretsu and profitability
for vertical keiretsu.
Thus, our study advances what we know about the keiretsu in three distinct ways. We
extend analyses to include: (1) both vertical and horizontal keiretsu (2) theorizing and
empirically testing the notion that for historical reasons performance goals for vertical and
horizontal keiretsu central firms differ (H1 and H2); and (3) theorizing and empirically
showing that power dependency theory predicts performance differences between central and
noncentral firms for both types of keiretsu (H3 and H4). In doing so we attempt to answer
three questions: Do central firms benefit from being central to a Japanese keiretsu? Are central
firms the primary beneficiary of a Japanese keiretsu? And do horizontal and vertical central
firms benefit differently?
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2. Literature and theory development
Horizontal keiretsu are characterized by interlocking board memberships, strong, rarely
traded reciprocal equity positions and lending ties with a central financial firm (McGuire and
Dow, 2009). These relationships provide horizontal members advantages including stable
financing, insulating firms from market pressures (Sheard, 1994) and reciprocal monitoring
which can reduce risk for transaction partners (Khanna and Yafeh, 2005).
Studies examining horizontal keiretsu performance find evidence of lower risk and
income smoothing across the group (Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) and McGuire and Dow
(2003)). Wang et al. (2005) find horizontal keiretsu affiliation significant for Japanese owned
foreign subsidiaries remaining profitable or improving profitability during the Asian economic
crisis of 19971998. They conclude that horizontal keiretsu affiliation can help shelter resources
and further adaptation in radically changed environments.
Studies point to advantages for central firms in horizontal keiretsu. Kim et al. (2004)
found differences in sales growth between central and noncentral firms. Weinstein and Yafeh
(1998) found that member firms relying on central firm financing have higher costs of capital
than independent firms. Bernotas (2005) suggests that central firm banks, stress their ‘creditor’
role (emphasizing lower risk strategies and asset protection) rather than their ‘shareholder’ role
(emphasizing profitability), finding that member firms with strong central firm lending
relationships don’t maximize profits. Evidence suggests that Horizontal keiretsu benefits do not
distribute uniformly across members.
Vertical keiretsu are characterized by a central manufacturing firm, key suppliers and
affiliated suppliers where material equity holdings run from the central manufacturer and key
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suppliers to affiliated suppliers (McGuire and Dow, 2009). Benefits of vertical keiretsu include:
fewer suppliers, lowered transactions costs, increased coordination and innovation, lower
opportunism, easier international entry and more stable production (McGuire and Dow, 2009;
Tabeta and Rahman, 1999). Dyer and Ouchi (1993) estimated that in 1986 the limited number of
suppliers used by Toyota due to its keiretsu centrality gave it a 10% cost advantage against
General Motors.
Equity ownership in affiliated suppliers is approximately three times that of independent
suppliers (Tabeta and Rahman, 1999). Such ownership suggests a control orientation (Lincoln et
al., 1996; McGuire and Dow, 2009; Tabeta and Rahman, 1999) that benefits central firms. For
example, Peng et al. (2001) suggest that innovation in a vertical keiretsu is driven by the needs of
the central manufacturer. Lincoln and Gerlach (2004: 29–30) wonder if vertical keiretsu
“generate genuine efficiencies or whether the advantages they afford to parent firms… come at
the expense of the profits, growth rates, and wages of suppliers.” Dow and McGuire (2009)
compare what they call strongly and weakly affiliated keiretsu members to independent firms
and find evidence that strongly affiliated members benefit at the expense of weakly affiliated
members.
When resources are exchanged, dependencies can be created, representing power
imbalances. Resources include assets, attributes, and conditions within a relationship that
generate and represent organizational dependence, indebtedness, or allegiance to each other
(Berthon, et al., 2003). Through the exchange of such resources power dependent relationships
are formed where dependent organizations are subject to influence attempts by more powerful
organizations that control critical resources or contingencies (Berthon et al., 2003).
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Unequal distribution of benefits can be created through the influence of power
dependence. Yamaguchi (1996) suggests that actors with greater power attempt to maximize
their own benefits. Molm et al. (1999) suggests that power imbalances create inequality in
exchanging benefits; more powerful actors receive greater benefits. When powerdependence
relationships exist, more powerful actors may influence the decision making of less powerful
actors and/or receive greater benefits. In our hypotheses we propose that benefits arising from
horizontal and vertical keiretsu systems do not accrue equally across all members; central firms
disproportionately achieve their aims at the expense of other member firms.

3. Hypotheses
3.1 Horizontal keiretsu central firms versus vertical keiretsu central firms
Business groups commonly occur in weak/uncertain institutional environments
(Granovetter, 2005), like the environment which spawned the prewar zaibatsu. Affiliation with
a business group increases stability for firms by internalizing transactions and reducing risk,
particularly compared to unaffiliated firms when environments lack strong, stable institutions
(Carney et al, 2011). Given weak, uncertain institutional environments, firm goals (profit
stability, survival or profitability) are more achievable within the more predictable, internal
business group environment. Firms commonly subordinate themselves, creating power
dependency relationships, in exchange for entry into the predictable business group
environment, improving their chances of surviving and achieving their objectives.
Horizontal keiretsu originated from the bankaffiliated zaibatsu but was tempered by
economic turbulence of the 1920’s that led to extensive zaibatsu failure (Morck and Nakamura,
2005). The zaibatsu that survived, such as Mitsui and Sumitomo, did so because the banks
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they owned held diversified risks instead of solely being a funding source and weren’t overly
exposed to the outcomes associated with a single firm or industry. This reinforced stability
concerns, that eventually lead to the creation of what becomes horizontal keiretsu business
groups.
Initially in the Post WWII occupation of Japan, America sought to dissolve the zaibatsu
through banking reform and regulatory initiatives. The U.S. later retreated from this position
due to the deepening Cold War and the increasing influence of the Soviet Union in the Pacific.
This retreat allowed former zaibatsu owners to take advantage of the weak institutional
environment and reconstitute portions of their former organizations as horizontal keiretsu
utilizing the banking laws. Post WW II Japanese banks were allowed to own equity in non
financial firms (Morck and Nakamura, 2005) giving them the potential ability to create
monopolistic positions through pyramid structures. Japan’s history of economic turbulence and
concentrationinduced failure sensitized financial firms to these risks, orienting them toward
safety as a primary goal; creating a preference for stability in profits, particularly for the
financial firms central to the horizontal keiretsu (Morck & Nakamura, 2005).
The powerful horizontal keiretsu central firms imposed profit stability goals on member
firms. Using the lure of increased chances of survival (capital access, managerial expertise),
central firms induced many member firms in unrelated industries to enter into power
dependency (equity, debt and management interlock) relationships (Bernotas, 2005; McGuire
and Dow, 2003; Prowse, 1992). Horizontal keiretsu membership is commonly limited by ‘wan
setto shugi’ or the ‘oneset’ principle; only one large firm from each major economic sector
was allowed (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004), fostering stability. Also intragroup trade was
limited (Lincoln & Shimotani 2010). Power dependency facilitated membership and transaction
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restrictions effectively resulted in horizontal keiretsu having diversified portfolios, limiting the
negative economic impact of any single firm on other firms or central firms.
Vertical keiretsu have an origin unrelated to the institutional setting which formed the
horizontal zaibatsu. The Meiji Restoration created conditions for a rapid industrialization of
Japan (Morck and Nakamura, 2005) which led to the formation of industrial focused zaibatsu
by skilled engineers, such as Toshiba and Hitachi, to take advantage of scale and scope
economies (Morck and Nakamura, 2005). The 1930’s Japanese military used these zaibatsu as
command and control structures focused on industrial efficiency but post WWII Soviet
aggression pivoted the emphasis of U.S. policy from rebuilding industrial Japan toward
defending the region. The industrial focused zaibatsu were critical to this effort (Morck and
Nakamura, 2005).
Vertical keiretsu are the modern descendants of these industrialbased zaibatsu. The
U.S. reconstruction of industrial Japan redirected zaibatsu toward American corporate
governance with an emphasis on profits and growth (Morck and Nakamura, 2005). Under U.S.
occupation, the Japanese wartime goal of zaibatsu industrial efficiency became, with Anglo
American “guidance”, directed toward the twin vertical keiretsu goals of profits and growth.
Vertical keiretsu are concerned with economic efficiency. Similar to horizontal keiretsu,
membership is used as a central mechanism to foster these goals. Using the lure of growth and
profitability [long term contracts, technical efficiencies (Tabeta and Rahman, 1999; Lai, 1999)]
member firms enter into power dependency relationships [relationshipspecific investments,
management interlocks (Sambharya and Banerji, 2006)] fostering the more powerful central
firm’s profitability goal. Large manufacturing central firms limit vertical keiretsu membership
to industryspecific, related sectors, emphasizing industry relevant profitability factors such as
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scale, supplier integration, innovation and just in time inventory (Lincoln and Shimotani,
2010).
In order to take advantage of opportunities offered by the central manufacturer other
members subordinate their autonomy, often through relationshipspecific investments, creating
power dependency. Such vertical integration fosters industry level efficiencies, enhancing
profit in a manner that is similar to related diversifiers (Markides and Williamson, 1994); it also
exposes vertical keiretsu to greater industryspecific volatility than horizontal keiretsu.
Given the above reasoning, we theorize that central firms in horizontal keiretsu and
vertical keiretsu use power dependency relationships with member firms to facilitate two
distinct goals. For central horizontal keiretsu members the goal is profit stability while
profitability is the goal for central vertical keiretsu manufacturers.
Central firms in horizontal keiretsu use the lure of increased stability and increased
chances of survival to induce firms in unrelated industries to enter into power dependency
relationships with the central firm. We hypothesize that from these diversified relationships
central horizontal keiretsu firms are able to achieve greater profit stability than the central
vertical keiretsu firms.
Large central manufacturers limit vertical keiretsu to specific industry sectors,
emphasizing industryrelevant success factors. To take advantage of opportunities presented by
the central manufacturer, smaller industryspecific firms freely enter into power dependency
relationships, allowing the manufacturer to pursue its goal of profits.
We hypothesize that due to these effects, central manufacturers in vertical keiretsu have
higher levels of profits than the central firms found in horizontal keiretsu. While central firms
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in horizontal keiretsu have greater profit stability than central manufacturers in vertical
keiretsu.

H1  Horizontal keiretsu central firms typically have greater profit stability than vertical
keiretsu central firms.
H2  Vertical keiretsu central firms typically have greater profitability than horizontal
keiretsu central firms.

3.2 Horizontal keiretsu central firms versus noncentral firms
Central firms draw upon a wide range of industries and member firms in constructing
horizontal keiretsu. By diversifying, the central firm’s minimizes financial risk, helping to
generate more stable profits (Lawrence and Saxonhouse, 1991).
Bernotas (2005) found that in Japan the largest debt holder typically controls 25% of a
firm’s debt and 5% of the firm’s equity, ownership levels significantly in excess of U.S. levels.
The central firm’s position within the horizontal keiretsu allows it to act as an agent for
multiple cross shareholdings held by other keiretsu members, allowing it to control a much
larger equity position than a 5% equity position suggests (Bernotas, 2005).
This dual role as critical lender and important shareholder creates opportunities to create
power dependence relationships (Bernotas, 2005; McGuire and Dow, 2003). As both major
lender and significant equity holder, the central firm is able to obtain transparent information
about member firms (McGuire and Dow, 2003) and to influence the actions of management
(Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998), putting the central firm in a position to enhance its goals, even at
the expense of noncentral firms. Central firms stress their ‘creditor’ role (emphasizing lower
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risk strategies and asset protection) rather than their ‘shareholder’ role (emphasizing
profitability); consequentially member firms with strong central firm lending relationships
don’t maximize profits (Bernotas 2005).
Information access and influence benefit central firms in many ways. Transparent
information allows horizontal keiretsu central firms to make lower risk loans by identifying risk
issues that might not be revealed in standard underwriting processes and also can enable high
level monitoring (Bernotas, 2005) by allowing central firms to identify managerial high risk
actions. Horizontal keiretsu structures enable central firms to mobilize their cross
shareholdings to enact collective action (Aoki et al 1994) including the censure and potential
replacement of top management (Sheard, 1994) and also allow central firms to identify and
potentially intervene in troubled situations earlier than normal loan covenants would.
Central firm actions facilitating collective action are well documented. For instance,
scholarship identified lower bankruptcy risks for horizontal keiretsu members compared to
independent firms (Suzuki and Wright 1985). Central firm influence has been linked to member
firms sacrificing shortterm profitability to repay longterm debt (Bernotas, 2005) or to making
less risky investment decisions (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). Central firms may influence
transactions to benefit weaker portfolio members at the expense of stronger portfolio members,
creating profit redistribution (e.g., Lincoln et al., 1996) but benefiting central firm stability.
Each example illustrates power dependency relationships between central firms and other
member firms.
In summary, the horizontal keiretsu central firm’s power is derived from its unique
position as important lender and equity holder, granting it monitoring and influence
capabilities, directing member firms toward actions resulting in greater profit stability for
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central firms and less profit stability for member firms. Based on this discussion, we
hypothesize that in horizontal keiretsu central firms have greater profit stability than other
member firms.
H3. Horizontal keiretsu central firms typically have more stable profits (less profit risk)
than less central horizontal keiretsu member firms.
3.3 Vertical keiretsu central firms versus member firms
A vertical keiretsu is an integrated value chain (Dyer, 1996) composed of one large,
central manufacturer and many smaller firms with clearly defined roles (Lai, 1999; Lawrence
and Saxonhouse, 1991). Smaller member firms are typically suppliers or distributors (Lai,
1999) that invest in transaction specific assets that benefit the central manufacturer (Sambharya
and Banerji, 2006). In turn, the large, central manufacturer provides technological efficiencies,
financial resources, and longterm business contracts (Das and Teng, 2002) to member firms.
Past vertical keiretsu scholarship hasn’t focused on the central firm; but emphasized the
positive effect of the keiretsu on collective performance. For example, McGuire & Dow (2009,
p338) summarize the literature noting many group level effects including how “relational
capital and close ties with suppliers may lower transaction costs, encourage coordination and
communication and engender a longterm perspective which limits opportunism.” The current
study is the first to examine advantages that power dependency gives to central manufacturing
firms in vertical keiretsu.
Providing member firms with key resources in exchange for transaction specific assets,
allows the central manufacturer to gain power over other vertical keiretsu members. For
instance, in the Japanese automobile industry, the automaker (central firm) can offer substantial
managerial, technical and financial resources to member firm suppliers. In exchange the
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automaker influences member firms’ asset specific investment decisions thereby dominating
the keiretsu (Sambharya and Banerji, 2006). Transactions occurring between automaker and
member firm suppliers make the automaker central to the vertical keiretsu (Sambharya and
Banerji, 2006), reinforcing its dominant position in keiretsu power dependence relationships
(Pfeffer, 1981).
Central manufacturers typically have several member firm supplier sources for each
component they purchase (McMillan, 1990), creating internal competition between the member
firms resulting in price competition and allowing central manufacturers to purchase products or
services at lower prices (Sambharya and Banerji, 2006). Thus, central manufacturers’ power
over smaller suppliers in a vertical keiretsu, allow it to shift costs to group members. Lower
prices increase profit margins for central manufacturers while reducing profitability for group
members. Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize that due to power dependence,
vertical keiretsu central firms typically have greater profits than noncentral member firms.

H4 Vertical keiretsu central firms typically are more profitable than less central vertical
keiretsu member firms.

4. Method
4.1. Sample
We created a sample of keiretsu firms using COMPUSTAT Global and Dodwell’s
Industrial Groupings in Japan (IGJ). Sample firms needed to be classified as keiretsu
members in IGJ and be publicly listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). The time frame
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chosen is the “postbubble economy” Japan, 19992007; we chose the most recent time frame
available (19992007), to reflect the current state of Japanese keiretsu.
Following previous keiretsu studies (Kim et al., 2004; McGuire and Dow, 2003), IGJ
(DodwellIGJ, 1996/7) is used to identify keiretsu affiliations. Firms affiliated with one of the
eight bankcentered groups (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuji, DaiIchi Kango , Sanwa,
Tokai, and IBJ) are classified as horizontal firms. Firms affiliated with one of the 34
“independent” vertical groupings listed in IGJ are identified as vertical firms (Dow et al.,
2011). To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we used IGJ’s classification of four stars firms to identify
the most central keiretsu firms. The final sample contained 417 keiretsu members (221
horizontal keiretsu members and 196 vertical keiretsu members) including 153 central keiretsu
firms (118 horizontal central keiretsu firms and 35 vertical central keiretsu firms).

4.2. Dependent variables
We used Return on Assets (ROA) (Kim et al., 2004) to measure profitability. We
calculated ROAi as annual income in year i divided by total assets in year i. Profit stability was
measured as the standard deviation of ROAi from 1999 to Year i (Palich et al., 2000) with
higher standard deviations for ROAi, representing less stable profits. This operationalization of
profit stability may be sensitive to the number of years within the panel window. In order to
examine this issue, we reexamined the model using a cross sectional design which
standardized the calculation of the profit stability measure. The cross sectional model supported
the findings of the panel model reported here.

4.3. Control variables
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Three control variables, firm size, financial structure and industry past research
identified related to firm performance and profit stability (Kim et al. (2004), McGuire and Dow
(2003) and Spanos et al. (2004)) were used. We measured firm size, by the total number of firm
employees (Baum and Wally, 2003; Spanos et al., 2004), financial structure as the ratio of
liability to equity (Kim et al., 2004). Eight industries (construction, electronic equipment,
chemical, machines, transportation, transportation equipment, rubber and mining) classified by
SIC 2digit code were used to control for industryspecific influences (Dess et al., 1990;
Geringer et al., 2000; McGuire and Dow, 2003).

4.4 Method
Because our data is time series and the level of analysis is mixed (firms nested within
groups), a mixed model, which takes into account nesting effects, is appropriate for testing the
relationships in question (Hitt et al., 2007). In a basic multilevel regression model, there are
two levels: individual firms (level 1) are nested within groups (level 2). Longitudinal design
can also be approached as another type of nested structure, with measurements occasions (level
1) nested within individual firms (level 2). Unlike the basic multilevel design, the current
research design has 3 levels: timeseries performance measurements (level 1) are nested within
individual keiretsu firms (level 2) which are associated with particular keiretsu groups (level 3).
At level 1 (within firms)

y

tij

S 0ij  H tij

where

y

tij

is the ROA for firm i in group j

measured in year t. The intercept is S 0ij and H tij is the error term. We used auto regressive
covariance structure as the level 1 covariance structure. Since we have good reasons to believe
that firmlevel ROA in year t is very likely correlated with ROA in another year, the subject is
not independent. Since S 0ij is likely different across the firms, S 0ij is the function of other firm
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level variables, all the control variables (industry dummy, firm size, firm age, financial
structure) and the independent variables. Thus, at level 2 (between firms)

p 0ij = b00 j + b01 j (industry) + b02 j (age) + b03 j (size) + b04 j ( financialstructure) + b05 j (IV) +g0ij
where E 00 j is the intercept, J 0ij is the error term for the between firms model and;

E 01 j represents within group j, the influence of industry on ROA.
E 02 j represents within group j, the influence of age on ROA,
E 03 j represents within group j, the influence of size on ROA.

E 04 j represents within group j, the influence of financial structure on ROA.
E 05 j represents within group j, the influence of IV on ROA.
The combined level 2 model is ytij = b00 j + b01 j (industry) + b02 j (age) + b03 j (size) +

b04 j ( financialstructure) + b05 j (IV) +g0ij +etij
In the next step, we are interested in understanding the factors that explain E 00 j , E 01 j ... E 05 j .
If we assume that E 00 j varies across groups, the grand mean of ROA is J 000 , and other variables

E 01 j … E 05 j don’t vary across groups, then it is a random intercept and a fixed slope model.

Random intercept and fixed slope model (RIFSM)

E 00 j

J 000  P00 j

E 01 j

J 010

E 02 j

J 020

E 01 j

J 010

E 03 j

J 030

E 04 j

J 040

E 05 j

J 050

So the combined random intercept and fixed slope model is

gtij = g000 +m00 j +g010 (industry) +g020 ( age) +g030 ( size) +g040 ( financialstructure) +
g040 ( financialstructure) +g050 ( IV ) +g0ij +etij where J 000 is the intercept and P 00 j is the error in

equations at Level 3.

17

If we assume both E 00 j and E 01 j … E 05 j vary across groups, then it is a random intercept
and a random slope model (RIRSM). Based on Heck et al (2010), when dealing with such a
complicated multilevel design, the use of SPSS Mixed is the most appropriate. Thus, we used
the SPSS Linear Mixed Model (MIXED) to conduct our analysis.
The use of longitudinal data and SPSS MIXED provides three advantages over cross
sectional analyses. First, longitudinal data has more degrees of freedom and therefore, estimates
are more efficient than in crosssectional designs. Second, the SPSS MIXED allows for
violations of sphericity in the error structure (Ployhart et al., 2002; Quene and Bergh, 2004).
Violations of the sphericity assumption are very common in the repeated measures data. The
traditional GLM procedure places rather severe restrictions on sphericity, since violations of
sphericity will affect the interpretation of significance tests. Unlike GLM, the SPSS MIXED
model does not require sphericity. Finally, the SPSS MIXED is able to represent the results in
one model as opposed to multiple levels by incorporating random effects into the model.
We used the 2log likelihood ratio to compare the performance of the RIFSM and
RIRSM models. We found the model with a random slope component tends to yield the lowest
2 log Likelihood ratio, indicating a better model fit. However, the results of all models yield
consistent results when examining the relationships between independent variables and
dependent variables. To simplify the models, we report the results of the random intercept and
fixed slope model.
5. Findings
First, we combined horizontal keiretsu data and the vertical keiretsu data to examine the
correlations between variables. Table 1 shows centrality is positively correlated with
profitability and negatively correlated with profit stability. This provides initial support for our
18

hypotheses.

Table 1 About Here

5.1. Horizontal keiretsu central firms and vertical keiretsu central firms
Table 2 compares horizontal and vertical central firms on profitability and stability. For
Models 1 through 4 the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) is reported. The ICC represents
the amount of variance between keiretsu groups, calculated as follows: (intercept covariance
parameter estimate)/(intercept covariance parameter estimate + residual covariance parameter
estimate) (Bliese, 2000; Singer, 1998). These estimates indicate that firms within a keiretsu, in
general, are not completely independent and as a result, an ordinary regression analysis may
yield misleading results (greater ICC indicates greater dependence). ICC value above 0.10
indicates nonindependence of a DV (Bliese and Ployhart, 2002). The models are arranged
incrementally (as variables are added): the initial models (1 and 3) include only the control
variables; the next models (2 and 4) add the horizontal central binary to test Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Model 1 presents the effect of control variables on profit stability for central horizontal
and vertical keiretsu firms. Panel data includes 945 firm/year observations. The analysis focuses
on central firms; the calculation of profit stability necessarily loses some firm/year observations
compared to Model 3. Only the construction industry control variable is significant. In Model 2,
the horizontal central keiretsu binary is added to examine central horizontal versus central
vertical keiretsu profit stability. The ICC of 0.27 indicates the multilevel analysis is appropriate
(Bliese and Ployhart, 2002). The AIC decrease from Model 1 to Model 2 indicates that the
increase in explanatory power of the model due to the addition of the horizontal central keirestu
binary is greater than the penalty assessed for the increase in the number of parameters
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(Burnham and Anderson, 2004). The improved model fit, through the addition of the horizontal
central keiretsu binary, is supported by the significance of the change in Chi2 (Kumar and
Sharma, 1999).
In Model 2 the coefficient for central horizontal keiretsu firms is negative and statistically
significant (β = 2.68, p < .001). Thus, central horizontal keiretsu firms tend to have a lower
standard deviation for ROA and are more stable than central vertical keiretsu firms. This result
indicates that central horizontal keiretsu firms have more stable profits than central vertical
keiretsu firms, supporting Hypothesis 1.
Model 3 presents the effect of control variables on profitability of central horizontal and
vertical keiretsu firms. The panel data includes 1052 firm/year observations. The control
variables for financial structure and the construction industry are both significant. In Model 4,
the horizontal central keiretsu binary is added to examine differences in central horizontal versus
central vertical keiretsu profitability. The ICC of 0.15 indicates the multilevel analysis is
appropriate (Bliese and Ployhart, 2002). The AIC decline from Model 3 to Model 4 supports the
importance of the added variable (Burnham and Anderson, 2004). Improved model fit, through
the addition of the horizontal central keiretsu binary, is supported by the significance of the
change in Chi2 (Kumar and Sharma, 1999).
In Model 4 the coefficient for central horizontal keiretsu firms is negative and significant
(β = 1.82, p < .001) indicating that central horizontal keiretsu firms tend to have lower average
profitability than central vertical keiretsu firms. Axiomatically, central vertical keiretsu firms
have greater profitability than central horizontal keiretsu firms, supporting Hypothesis 2.

Table 2 About Here
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5.2. Central versus noncentral keiretsu firms
Table 3 compares results for central and noncentral horizontal and vertical keiretsu firms
with respect to profit stability and profitability. Models 5 and 7 include control variables for
profit stability and profitability, respectively. Models 6 and 8 add centrality in order to test
Hypotheses 3 and 4. Model 9 reexamines central firms versus noncentral firms for the vertical
keiretsu, without the nested effects due to the low ICC of Model 8, explained below.
Model 5 presents the effect of control variables on profit stability for horizontal keiretsu
firms. Panel data includes 1423 observations and focuses on horizontal firms. Control variables
for the electronic equipment industry and financial structure are significant. Model 6 adds the
horizontal central keiretsu binary comparing central keiretsu profit stability to noncentral
keiretsu profit stability. The ICC at 0.11 indicates that the multilevel analysis is appropriate
(Bliese and Ployhart 2002). The AIC decline from Model 5 to Model 6 supports the importance
of the added variable (Burnham and Anderson, 2004). Improved model fit, through the addition
of the horizontal central keiretsu binary, is supported by the significance of the change in Chi2
(Kumar and Sharma, 1999). Model 6 shows a negative and statistically significant (β = 0.41, p <
.05) coefficient for central horizontal keiretsu firms indicating that they typically have greater
profit stability than noncentral horizontal firms, supporting Hypothesis 3.
Model 7 presents the effect of the control variables on profitability of vertical keiretsu
firms. The panel data includes 1509 observations. The electronic equipment industry and
financial structure control variables are significant. In Model 8, the vertical central keiretsu
binary is added to compare central keiretsu profitability against non central keiretsu profitability.
The AIC decline from Model 5 to Model 6 supports the importance of the added variable
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(Burnham and Anderson, 2004). Improved model fit, through the addition of the horizontal
central keiretsu binary, is supported by the significance of the change in Chi2 (Kumar and
Sharma, 1999).
In Model 8, the coefficient for central vertical keiretsu is positive and significant (β =
0.64, p < .001) indicating that they are more profitable than non central vertical keiretsu firms,
supporting Hypothesis 4. However, the ICC of Model 8 is 0.05 indicating the applicability of a
nonnested model (Bliese and Ployhart, 2002). To address this, we estimated Model 9, dropping
the nested effect of firms within keiretsu groups. The results of Model 9 are very similar to
Model 8 with the coefficient for central vertical keiretsu significant (β = 0.6, p < .001). The
results of Model 8 and Model 9 both find that central vertical keiretsu firms tend to be more
profitable than non central vertical keiretsu firms, supporting Hypothesis 4.

Table 3 About Here

5.3 Post Hoc Analyses
We conducted post hoc sensitivity analyses to see if our results are consistent across
different keiretsu groups. Overall the post hoc sensitivity analyses supported our general
findings. Seven of the eight horizontal keiretsu groups showed that central horizontal keiretsu
firms had greater profit stability than noncentral horizontal keiretsu members. Twentyfour of
29 vertical groups showed that central vertical keiretsu firms were more profitable than non
central vertical keiretsu firms. One last post hoc analysis examined the stability of the central
versus noncentral firm effect across time. We split the sample into two periods 19992003 and
20032007 and conducted profitability and stability analysis. Across both periods, vertical
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keiretsu central firms remain significantly advantaged compared to noncentral member firms
but central horizontal keiretsu firms were significantly advantaged only in the 19992003 period.
We speculated that the lack of significance of the centrality variable for the horizontal
keiretsu in 20032007 may be attributed to two differing proximate reasons, the changing nature
of the horizontal keiretsu due to economic and political pressures and/or a difference in the level
of economic volatility between the periods. During 20032007, where we did not find statistical
significance, a great deal of change was occurring in the horizontal keiretsu. Mergers of central
keiretsu banks disrupted the oneset principal, reducing the number of horizontal keiretsu. ‘Trust
banks’ becoming among the biggest shareholders of large Japanese firms (Schaede, 2006) also
has an uncertain effect on the actions of the affected horizontal keiretsu member firms. None of
these changes mean that the power dependence relationships have disappeared, but relationships
are changing and in need of further study.
Second, differences in overall levels of economic volatility may affect our stability
measure; the use of power dependency by the central firm to stabilize profits may be easier to
detect in volatile times because they create a larger difference in ROA stability between the
central firm and noncentral firms than in times of greater overall economic stability. For this
reason, studying the effect of central firm stability compared to noncentral firm stability is
better done over a longer period in order to more easily view central firm stability against the
backdrop of greater volatility in GDP economic cycles.

6. Conclusion
This study is an initial attempt to predict and explain relative central firm performance
and stability for both horizontal and vertical keiretsu. Using a historical perspective we
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hypothesized and found that: (1) central vertical keiretsu firms are more profitable than central
horizontal keiretsu firms; and (2) central horizontal keiretsu firms have greater profit stability
than central vertical keiretsu firms. Using a powerdependence perspective we hypothesized
and found that: (1) central vertical keiretsu firms are more profitable than non central vertical
keiretsu firms; and (2) central horizontal keiretsu firms have greater profit stability than non
central horizontal keiretsu firms.
Evidence supports the notion that central firms perform better than member firms for
both types of keiretsu, (in 19992003 for horizontal keiretsu and for both 19992003 and 2003
2007 for vertical keiretsu). In vertical keiretsu, the central manufacturer is always the largest
and most resource abundant firm. Hence, although the empirical analysis supports our power
dependency predictions, there is no way in vertical keiretsu, using our data, to separate the lead
manufacturer’s central position from its resource abundance and therefore no way provide a
critical test to differentiate between two competing explanations (power dependency versus
resource superiority). This represents a limitation of our study. Future efforts using primary
data may be able to separate out the effects of superior resources versus power dependency to
determine which influences lead manufacturer vertical keiretsu performance.
Based on our empirical results, we draw three conclusions. First, it appears that keiretsu
central firms use power to become the primary beneficiary of a keiretsu. Second, systematic
performance differences exist between horizontal and vertical keiretsu central firms; central
vertical keiretsu firms have greater profitability while central horizontal keiretsu firms have
greater profit stability. Third, benefits central keiretsu firms derive from the group structures is
obtained from reduced profits/profit stability of noncentral keiretsu firms.
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We also draw managerial implications. While both vertical and horizontal central
keiretsu firms are interested in profits, there are differences in the strategies they pursue. In
vertical keiretsu, central manufacturers shift costs to noncentral member firms. Resulting cost
savings commonly create pricebased advantages for them compared to typical multinational
enterprises. In horizontal keiretsu, central firms influence noncentral member firms to
minimize risk. Foreign competitors need to understand what type of keiretsu firm they are
dealing with in order to develop effective counterstrategies.

6.1. Limitations and future research
This study has several limitations. First, our sample only included publicly traded
companies. Future research may wish to extend our research questions by examining private
keiretsu firms. Second, we used simple constructs to measure profits and profit stability (ROA
and standard deviations of ROA). Future research may wish to use other measures of firm
performance including: sales, sales growth, Tobin’s Q and/or debt. Third, our measure of group
affiliation is from 1996/1997 as more recent IGJ listings are unavailable. This represents a
significant limitation for our study as horizontal Keiretsu structures are changing. How these
changes affect historical relationships is, at this point, unclear and needs further study.
Finally, our paper raises additional research questions. For instance, given that the
primary beneficiaries of keiretsu structures are the central firms, why do members firms
continue to stay? In the early development of the keiretsu institutional voids set the conditions
for joining a business group (Carney, 2008). But as Japan developed modern institutional
structures, the keiretsu form of governance continued to persist.
We point to three possible reasons. First, tradition reflected in the institutional norms of
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conformity and legitimacy may account for some of this. Thus, future scholars may wish to
apply institutional theory in their attempts to answer this question. The keiretsu have been
remarkably resistant to change (McGuire and Dow, 2003) and some member firms may stay
due to institutional advantages like legitimacy or for simply historical reasons.
Second, a power dependency perspective may explain why member firms remain. Even
as institutional environments in which business groups operate mature, central firms in
positions of power are unlikely to voluntarily relinquish their power advantages (McGuire and
Dow 2009). It may be that many firms remain because of power dependency relationships that
persist between central and member firms.
Finally, keiretsu membership may provide some spillover benefits. Lincoln, et al.
(1996) found less variability in the performance of horizontal keiretsu firms compared to
independent firms. McGuire and Dow (2003) found that horizontal keiretsu firm performance
remained stable even after major economic and regulatory changes took place in Japan in the
early 1990s. Will recent changes to some of the horizontal keiretsu change that?
Thus, our paper is research opening, raising as many questions as it answers. For
instance, do our findings hold over long periods of time or do “boom and bust” cycles moderate
these relationships? Do our findings generalize to business groups in other countries? Do
central firms exist in other nations’ business groups? If so, do these central firms play a similar
or different role in their respective groups? Are they the primary beneficiaries in these business
groups? Do recent changes in two of the horizontal keiretsu affect member/central firm
relationships? How? Future efforts, by addressing these and other questions, will be able to
better explain the role of the central firm in the keiretsu and provide better guidance to
managers who attempt to compete with keiretsu firms in the world marketplace.

26

References
Aoki, M., Patrick, H., and Sheard, P. (1994) The Japanese main bank system: An introductory
overview. In The Japanese Main Bank System, Aoki, M. and Patrick, H. (eds). Oxford
University Press: New York; 150
Baum, J. R., and Wally, S. (2003). Strategic decision speed and firm performance. Strategic
Management Journal, 24, 11071129.
Bernotas, D. (2005). Ownership structure and firm profitability in the Japanese keiretsu.
Journal of Asian Economics, 16, 533554.
Berthon, P., Pitt, L., Ewing, M., and Bakkerland, G. (2003) Norms and power in marketing
relationships: Alternative theories and empirical evidence. Journal of Business Research, 56(9),
699709.
Bliese, P. D. (2000). Withingroup agreement, nonindependence, and reliability: Implications
for data aggregation and analysis. In K. K. Klein, & S. W. J. Koslowski (Eds.), Multilevel
theory, research and methods in organizations (pp. 349381). San Francisco: JosseyBass.
Bliese, P. D., and Ployhart, R. E. (2002). Growth modeling using random coefficient models:
Model building, testing and illustrations. Organizational Research Methods, 5, 362387.
Burnham, K. P., and Anderson, D. R. (2004). Multimodel inference : Understanding AIC and
BIC in model selection, Sociological Methods & Research, 33, 261304.
Carney, M. (2008). The many futures of Asian business groups. Asia Pacific Journal of
Management, 25, 595613.
Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E., Heugens, P., and Van Oosterhout, J. (2011) Business group
affiliation, performance, context, and strategy: A meta analysis. Academy of Management
Journal, 54(3) 437460.
Das, T. K., and Teng, B. (2002). Alliance constellations: A social exchange perspective.
Academy of Management Review, 27, 445456.
Dess, G., Ireland, R. D., and Hitt, M. A. (1990). Industry effects and strategic management
research. Journal of Management, 16, 721.
Dodwell Marketing Consultants. Industrial groupings in Japan 1996/1997. Dodwell Marketing
Consultants: Tokyo, Japan.
Dow, S., and McGuire, J. (2009). Propping and tunneling: Empirical evidence from Japanese
keiretsu. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33, 18171828.

27

Dow, S., McGuire, J., and Yoshikawa, T. (2011). Disaggregating the group effect: Vertical and
horizontal keiretsu in changing economic times. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28, 299
323.
Dyer, J., c Ouchi, W. (1993). Japanesestyle business partnerships: Giving companies a
competitive advantage. Sloan Management Review, 35, 51–63.
Dyer, J. H. (1996). Does governance matter? Keiretsu alliance and asset specificity as sources
of Japanese competitive advantage. Organization Science, 7, 649668.
Gedajlovic, E., and Shapiro, D. (2002). Ownership structure and firm profitability in Japan.
Academy of Management Journal, 45, 565–575.
Geringer, M. J., Tallman, S., and Olsen, D. M. (2000). Product and international diversification
among Japanese multinational firms. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 5182.
Granovetter, M. 2005. Business groups and social organization. In N. J. Smelser & R.
Swedberg (Eds.), The handbook of economic sociology (2nd ed.): 429– 450. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Heck, R.H., Thomas, S.L., Tabata, L.N. (2010). Multilevel and longitudinal modeling with
IBM and SPSS. Routledge, New York, NY.
Hitt, M. A., Beamish, P. W., Jackson, S. E., and Mathieu, J. E. (2007). Building theoretical and
empirical bridges across levels: Multilevel research in management. Academy of Management
Journal, 50, 13851399.
Kim, H., Hoskisson, R. E., and Wan, W. P. (2004). Power dependence, diversification strategy
and performance in keiretsu member firms. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 613636.
Khanna, T., and Yafeh, Y. (2005). Business groups and risk sharing around the world. The
Journal of Business, 78, 301–340.
Kumar, A., and Sharma, S. (1999). A metric measure for direct comparison of competing
models in covariance structure analysis. Structural Equation Modeling, 6, 169197.
Lai, G. (1999). Knowing who you are doing business with in Japan: A managerial view of
keiretsu business groups. Journal of World Business, 34, 423448.
Lawrence, R. Z., and Saxonhouse, G. R. (1991). Efficient or exclusionist? The import behavior
of Japanese corporate groups. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 311330.
Lincoln, J. R., and Gerlach, M. L. (2004). Japan’s network economy: Structure, persistence,
and change. New York: Cambridge University Press.

28

Lincoln, J. R., Gerlach, M. L., and Ahmadjian, C. L. (1996). Keiretsu networks and corporate
performance in Japan. American Sociology Review, 61, 6788.
Lincoln, J. and Shimotani, M. (2010) Business networks in postwar Japan: Whiter the
keiretsu?. in Colpan, A.M., Hikino, T. & Lincoln, J.R. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Business
Groups. Oxford University Press, NY
Markides, C. and Williamson, P. (1994) Related diversification, core competences and
corporate performance. Strategic Management Journal, 15;149165
McGuire, J., and Dow, S. (2002). The Japanese keiretsu system: An empirical analysis. Journal
of Business Research, 55, 3340.
McGuire, J., and Dow, S. (2003). The persistence and implications of Japanese keiretsu
organization. Journal of International Business Studies, 34, 374388.
McGuire, J., and Dow, S. (2009). Japanese keiretsu: Past, present, future. Asia Pacific Journal
of Management, 26, 333351.
McMillan, J. (1990). Managing suppliers: Incentive systems in Japanese and United Sates
industry. California Management Review, 32, 3855.
Molm, L. D., Peterson, G., & Takahashi, N. (1999). Power in negotiated and reciprocal
exchange. American Sociology Review, 64, 876890.
Morck, R., and Nakamura, M. (2005). A frog in a well knows nothing of the ocean: A history
of corporate ownership in Japan. In R. Morck (Ed.), A history of corporate governance around
the world: Family business groups to professional managers. University of Chicago Press.
Palich, L. E., Cardinal, L. B., and Miller, C. C. (2000) Curvilinearity in the diversification
performance linkage: An examination of over three decades of research. Strategic
Management Journal, 21, 155174.
Peng, M., Lee S., and Tan, J. (2001). The keiretsu in Asia: Implications for multilevel theories
of competitive advantage. Journal of International Management, 7, 253276.
Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in Organizations. Massachusetts: Pitman Publishing.
Ployhart, R. E., Holtz, B. C., and Bliese, P. D. (2002). Longitudinal data analysis: Applications
of random coefficient modeling to leadership research. Leadership Quarterly, 13, 455486.
Prowse, S. D. (1992). The structure of corporate ownership in Japan. Journal of Finance, 47,
11211140.
Quené, H., and Bergh, H. (2004). On multilevel modeling of data from repeated measures
designs: A tutorial. Speech Communication, 43, 103121.

29

Sambharya, R. B., and Banerji, K. (2006). The effect of keiretsu affiliation and resource
dependencies on supplier firm performance in the Japanese automobile industry. Management
International Review, 46, 737.
Schaede, U. (2006). The Strategic Logic of Japanese Keiretsu, Main Banks and Cross
Shareholdings Revisited. Working Paper No. 247. Center on Japanese Economy and Business,
Columbia Business School. New York
Sheard, P. (1994). Interlocking shareholdings and corporate governance in Japan. In M. Aoki,
& M. Dore (Eds.). The Japanese firm: The sources of competitive strength (pp.310–349).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Singer, J. D. (1998). Using SAS PROC MIXED to fit multilevel models, hierarchical models,
and individual growth models. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 24, 323355.
Spanos, Y. E., Zaralis, G., and Lioukas, S. (2004). Strategy and industry effects on profitability:
evidence from Greece. Strategic Management Journal, 25, 139165.
Suzuki, S. and Wright, R.W. (1985). Financial structure and bankruptcy risk in Japanese
companies. Journal of International Business Studies, 16(1): 97110.
Tabeta, N., and Rahman, S. (1999). Risk sharing mechanism in Japan’s auto industry: The
keiretsu versus independent parts suppliers. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 16, 311–330.
Yamaguchi, K. (1996). Power in networks of substitutable and complementary exchange
relations: A rationalchoice model and an analysis of power centralization. American Sociology
Review, 61, 308332.
Wang, H. M., Huang, H., and Bansal, P. (2005). What determined success during the Asian
Economic crisis?  The importance of experiential knowledge and group affiliation. Asia
Pacific Journal of Management, 22, 89106.
Weinstein, D. E., and Yafeh, Y. (1998). On the costs of a bankcentered financial system:
Evidence from the changing main bank relations. Journal of Finance, 53, 635671.

30

Table 1
Correlation Matrix

31

Table 2
Horizontal keiretsu central firms and vertical keiretsu central firms

32

Table 3
Central keiretsu firms compared to non central keiretsu firms

33

